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SHALL THE TWAIN EVER MEET?: On the Cancellation of the June 
1997 Meeting of the Pope of Rome and the Patriarch of Moscow• 
SUMMARY 
by Ralph Della Cava 
Ralph Della Cava (Roman Catholic) is Professor of History, Queens College, CUNY 
Flushing, NY I I 367-I 597 & Senior Research Associate, ILA.IS, Columbia University 
At the start of I 998, rumors - as well as denials - are once again flying of an imminent, historic meeting 
between the Pope ofRome and the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. To put that prospect into perspective, 
the present article explores the I 6 June I 997 decision of the Holy Synod, the powerful interim governing body 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, to cancel the previously scheduled encounter of the two church leaders later 
that month. It also examines differing explanations offered for that decision and the background to some of the 
continuing misunderstandings between the two confessions. 
Two Steps Backward? 
June, 1997 may go do�n on record as the month and year when the Russian Orthodox Church, claimant 
of the loyalty of upwards of some I 00 million nominal believers in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus alone, took 
two decisive steps - back into its past! 
That past, marked by both an abiding suspicion of other world faiths and a territorially-based 
ecclesiastical monopoly buttressed by, and oft historically subordinate to, state power, would now seem - after 
seven tempering years of religious liberty - to be destined to repeat. 
The first step in this apparent about-face was the Russian Church's last-minute cancellation on the tenth 
of June 1997 of what would have been an historic encounter near Vienna- the first since the founding of 
Christianity among the Slavs a millennium ago - between a Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and a Pontiff 
of the Roman Catholic Church.1 Moreover, Pope John Paul II, as Patriarch of the West, a title conferred on 
his predecessors by a once undivided Christianity, would have in effect met Patriarch Aleksiy II, his Russian 
1 01997, 1998 Completed 29 June 1997 Revised 1.5 January 1998. NOT FOR REPRODUCTION WITHOUT 
AUTHOR'S PERMISSION. E-Mail Addresses: rd79@columbia.edu dellacav@qcvaxa.acc.qc.edu 
1 The decision was made by the Holy Synod at its meeting on I 0 June 1997; the official document 
was published in Department of External Church Relations, Moscow Patriarchate, Informatsionniy 
Bvulleten' (Moscow), 8:97 (17 June 1997), 1 -3, and apparently announced the following day. News of it 
appeared in Bruno Bartoloni, "Patriarch Calls off Pope Summit," The Moscow Tribune, I4 June I 997, I. 
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Orthodox confrere, on eccelesiastical common groWld. 2 
The second step backwards was surely the initially tacit, but then enthusiastic acceptance by the Moscow 
Patriarchate (over which Aleksiy II presides) of a bill that it had in fact long sought and for bener than three 
years helped fashion. Approved by a 3 37 to 5 vote of the Dwna on the eighteenth of JW1e 1997, and signed 
into law on the following twenty-sixth of September by Russia's President, Boris Yeltsin, the measure not only 
severely limits freedom of conscience and religion throughout the federation, but also invests Orthodoxy with 
privileges denied most other faiths. 3 
Optimistic or Pessimistic Future? 
At issue in the remarks which follow is not how both these steps will play themselves out in the coming 
days and months. Indeed, it is possible to imagine scenarios of quite opposite extremes. 
The optimistic one posits that the two aging and ailing patriarchs will fmd it within their failing powers 
to reschedule the long-sought meeting sometime in the near future. Each has affirmed his will to do so.� With 
respect to the new law, expectations remain high, if not entirely well-foWlded, that the Russian Federation's 
Supreme CoW1. will strike it down as a flagrant violation of Article 28 of the 199 3 Constitution guaranteeing 
religious liberty and in violation of many of the international treaties to which Russia is a party.$ 
2Historically speaking, the five apostolic patriarchates prior to the Great Schism of I 054 
were: Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Rome and Constantinople. After that date, all but Rome and 
five others -- Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia -- comprise the nine patriarchates which 
along with the four metroplitan or archdiocesan churches of Cyprus, Greece, Poland and Albania 
make up the autocephalous (self-governing) Orthodox churches in commWlion with each other under 
the "priority" of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. 
But, the complexity-- of history, organization, and doctrinal differences-- of the thirteen 
above and some forty other Eastern Christian churches cannot be dealt with here; instead, see the 
brief, but clear discussion by Ronald G. Roberson, CSP, The Eastern Christian Churches- A Brief 
Survey. (Rome: Edizioni "Orientalia Christiana," 1993), 4th Revised Edition. 
3 The "New Law" as it was passed by the Duma and in the subsequent version signed by 
President Boris Yeltsin in September 1997 over the protests of several Western governments and 
confessions are available in an English translation from the Keston News Service, Oxford, England at 
the following e-mail address: Keston.institute@keston.org 
4 Aleksiy II expressed his hope of rescheduling their meeting in a letter to the Pope, cited in 
·"Meeting of Patriarch, Pope Canceled over Differences," The Moscow Times, 14 JW1e 1997, 3.; John 
Paul II reiterated his intention to meet in his Sunday homily at St. Peter's on 22 JW1e 1997, as reported by 
the BBC on the night of22 JW1e 1997 and by Reuters in a dispatch from Vatican City and swnmarized in 
"Pope Appeals for Christians to Reconcile," The Moscow Times, 24 JWle 1997, 4. See the discussion 
later in the text. 
5 This view is largely expressed by West European and American observers and by local 
Russian human rights groups which, despite shortages of manpower and finances, are intent on testing 
the new Jaw in Russia's cotirts: see Pavel Mirzoev, "Natural Monopoly of the Patriarchate",Russkiy 
Tclegraf, 14 January 1998 as re- transmitted by the San Francisco-based, on-line news service, Holy 
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But, a pessimistic scenario is equally conceivable in light of the recent legislative victory. On the one 
side, outspoken moderate leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) may prove unable to beat back 
mounting offensives by ultra-nationalist clerics who denounce every act of ecumenism as a heresy and consider 
a meeting of the Patriarch with a "Polish" pope an outrage against Russian patriotism. 6 On the other hand, 
some of these same moderates may also prove unwilling to stand up fully for the rights of other confessions. 
In fact, in the recent past, church leaders in general have repeatedly and publicly labeled religious bodies 
such as Scientology and the Japan-based Aum Shinrikyo as destructive "sects" and "cults". At times, some 
have failed to make little or no distinction between those bodies on the one hand and Roman Catholics, 
Baptists and most main-line Protestant confessions on the other. Just as often they have condemned nearly all 
of these confessions outright for unfairly "proselytizing" on Russian soil, which the Patriarchate considers an 
exclusively "Orthodox domain."' 
Which of the scenarios or what mix of the two will describe reality will surely become clearer over the 
coming weeks and months. For now, however, what may be useful to explore are the dramatically changing 
circumstances that have lead to the present state of affairs. 
In this tex1, only the issue of the Pope's and Patriarch's meeting can be dealt with. 
Steps Toward the Failed Encounter 
Indeed, their encounter stands a good chance chance of being salvaged. Both sides have eagerly sought 
to meet for over two years. 
During the papal visit to Hungary in September 1996, and apparently at the initiative of several local 
Catholic prelates and their government, a meeting of the two religious leaders was scheduled at the celebrated 
Benedictine monastery in Pannonhalma, the founding of which - fittingly and symbolically - antedates the 
Great Schism of 1054. But, at the last minute the Patriarch is reported to have begged off as pressures from 
among ultra-nationalist clerics within the ROC were upped excessively. 
Trinity, available at: news@holy-trinity.org 
6 This has been expressed by Russian clerical ultra-nationalists and most recently spelled out 
by Serbian Orthodox who are intent on exiting from the WCC (see note 30, below); the clearly pejorative 
reference to the "Polish" pope was reported on good authority to have been made recently by a well-placed 
Orthodox clergyman. 
7 This exclusivity is elaborated by Orthodox ecclesiastics as "canonical territory," a concept 
rejected by most other faiths, but recognized in the breach by some. 
Concerning sects and cults, see the directory published by the Missionary Department of the 
Moscow Patriarchate: Missionerskiy Otdel Moskovskogo Patriarchate Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi, 
Novve Religioznye Organizatsii Rossii Destruktivnogo i Okkvl'tnogo Charaktera - Spravochnik 
(Belgorod, 1997). The preface contains important references to the "inapplicability" of the current 
guarantees of religious liberty (presumably the 1990 Law on Freedom of Religion and Conscience) 
and of the "American" and "European models" of church-state relations and religious freedom (presumably 
the wide spread acceptance of religious toleration and separation of church and state). 
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Then in November 1996 - according to well-placed sources - it was the Russians who eagerly proposed 
that both sides try again. The occasion would be the Second European Ecumenical Assembly which was held 
in Graz, Austria between 23 and 2 9 June 1997 under the sponsorship of Europe's Christian churches. 8 
Initially, it was suggested that not only the patriarchs of Moscow and Rome convene, but also that of Annenia 
as well as the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople-lstanbul.9 The latter is generally regarded throughout 
the Orthodox world as the "first among equals" and has been historically accorded the power, attributed to no 
other authority, to shape the consensus that either grants or confums autonomy and autocephaly (degrees of 
self-governance, from partial to full, respectively) to local and national churches. 
Since early 1996, the Russians have been at odds with Constantinople over the latter's reconfirmation of 
the original autonomy of the Orthodox Church of Estonia. With the Soviet occupation of the Baltics in 1940, 
the Estonian Church had involuntarily fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. With 
national independence in 1991, however, Estonian politicians of all persuasions, no less than churchmen of 
the Orthodox minority, contended for a return to pre-war ecclesiastical liberties. 
Moscow vehemently opposed it, but later formally relented and a face-saving, middle-term solution was 
hastily agreed to. Russian relations with Constantinople, however, have remained embittered. Might not then 
the meeting of patriarchs in Graz - where, under the theme of "Reconciliation - Gift of God and Source of New 
Life," some ten thousand faithful from hundreds of confessions were expected to gather - have been envisioned 
by Moscow as a chance to mend their differences? 
On 30 May, 1997, His All Holiness, Bartholomeos I, the Ecumenical Patriarch, had evidently concluded 
it had not. From Istanbul, he announced his decision to "postpone" - in effect, cancel - his expected 
participation in both the Assembly and his planned official state visit to Austria. He further charged that 
contrary to its expressed purpose, the Assembly was being turned into a "confrontation" between church 
leaders and that he did '"not wish to participate in a tug of war pitting supremacies against one another."'10 
Sources close to the Patriarch alleged that the cancellation came in the wake of " attempts by the Vatican 
and the Moscow Patriarchate to exploit the congress,"1 1 while subsequent press coverage indeed suggests that 
8 The official sponsors were the Conference of European Churches and the Council of European 
[Roman Catholic] Bishops' Conferences. The world press had given this event considerable attention; 
one starting point is John Thavis, "Vatican Working on Papal Meeting with Russian Orthodox Patriarch," 
Catholic News Service, 12 May 1997. 
9 Based on a dispatch from Reuters, "Orthodox patriarchs may make historic meeting with 
Pope," 09 May 1997. 
1 0 See "Vartholomeos cancels official visit to Austria," Athens News Agency Bulletin, (No 
1200), 31 May 1997; he added, "The events in Graz aim at reconciliation between Christians and 
should not be used to promote personal interests." 
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at some point between November 19% and late May 1997, Bartholomeos I and the Armenian church leader -
originally proposed by the Russians as participants - had somehow been deliberately dealt out of any "pan­
patriarchal" encounter. By early June, the venue also had shifted from Graz to Vienna, and still again to an 
ancient Cistercian monastery in Heiligenkreuz, some 20 kilometers (12 miles) southwest of Vienna.12 Only 
then - on or about 08 June - did officials of the Russian Orthodox Church go on record to confirm that the 
future encounter, were it to occur, would be strictly between the Pope and the Moscow Patriarch. 13 
Overtures by Pope and Patriarch 
Indeed, both sides have long put great store in a meeting of just the two. Since Vatican Council II (1962-
1965) Rome has eagerly sought to promote the cause of Christian Unity, while it is an open secret around the 
Vatican that since his election to the See ofPeter in 1978, the Holy Father has hoped not only one day to make 
the first pastoral visit of a Roman Pontiff to Russia, but also to preside over celebrations of the Third Christian 
Millennium at which the Moscow Patriarch's presence is considered indispensable. 
Indeed, some circles in Rome believe the Holy Father has made unnecessary concessions. Driven by a 
"calling" to put an end to the "scandal" of Christian division, he has in effect pledged to the Russians- in a 
series of encyclicals and official documents - to respect Orthodoxy's ascendance on Russian soil, to prohibit 
his own clergy from proselytizing there, and - to the dismay of Ukraine's minority Greek Catholics, liturgically 
Byzantine, but in union with the Holy See - to find forms of "full communion" with the Orthodox that would 
fall short of the latter's formal submission to papal authority (whose claim to infallibility is in no way 
recognized by world Orthodox-y) as had been required in the past14• 
12 See Edmund Doogue, "Ecumenical Patriarch 'postpones"' Austria visit," Ecumenical News 
International, ENI News Service, 02 June 1997; and the Associate Press dispatch, "Pope To Visit 
Austria," 06 June 1997. 
13 See the Reuters dispatch out of Moscow, "Roman, Russian Churches Discuss Historic 
Meeting," 09 June 1997: "The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church may meet Pope John Paul in 
Austria later this month in an unprecedented encounter between the two Christian leaders, a Russian 
church official said on Friday. "Talks are now being held between the Vatican and the Patriarchate in 
Moscow," said Timofei Zolotusk-y, an official in the Patriarchate's external relations department. "In 
all of history there has never been such a meeting," Zolotusky said. " Since talks are being held, it 
shows that both sides want it to happen." 
14 Many of these documents are contained in "Documentation ofEcumenical Statements and 
Initiatives of the Holy See in Regard to Central and Eastern Europe in the New Situation - January 
1989 - October 1992," a special issue of The Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity's 
Information Service, 81: III-IV (1992) and in subsequent issues of the same journal. 
These documents are discussed in passing in a series of articles by Ralph Della Cava: "The 
Roman Catholic Church in Russia, The Latin Rite: A Five Year Assessment -- Towards a 'Native' 
Russian Church?," Harriman Review, 9:4 (Winter), 46-57, also in a Russian translation in Stranitsv 
(Moscow), 2:2 (Spring 1997), 230-251; "Religious Resource Networks: Roman Catholic Philanthropy 
in Central and East Europe" in Transnational Religion and Fading States, edited by Susan Rudolph 
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Not a few Roman critics believe the papacy has gone too far. Yet. shortly after Heiligenkreuz was 
canceled, it might be said that the Holy Father went even farther. In his Sunday homily at St. Peter's on 22 June 
1997, he declared that "reconciliation must involve everyone ... all the people of Europe ... from the Atlantic 
to the Urals, from East to West." Then, in an obvious allusion to rescheduling his meeting with Aleksiy II, he 
underscored the "urgency" to overcome "'still open problems and sometimes unexpected upsets .. .'"15 
For his part. Aleksiy IT is no less intent in promoting the unity of the "one, holy, catholic and apostolic" 
Church (a defmition of early church councils which, incidentally, is held in common by Orthodox and 
Catholics as well as many reformation Christians). He said as much in his 1994 Christmas address on Vatican 
Radio and has reiterated that view subsequently. Moreover, in the aftermath of his canceled meeting with the 
Pope, he wrote the Holy Father, insisting on "'continuing the dialogue underway,'" and expressing the wish 
(according to the papal press secretary) '"that this meeting will be able to take place.'"16 As recently as 15 
January 1998, at the closing of the regular twice yearly "bi-lateral conversations" between the Holy See and 
the Patriarchate, he reportedly again "voiced his willingness to attend such a meeting and to continue the 
dialogue,'' although not until "obstacles" to the same were overcome.17 
Benefits to Moscow 
Indeed, for Russian Orthodoxy such a meeting has broad significance. In at least three respects, Moscow 
would have much to gain from it. 
First of all, it would likely result not only in establishing direct access to Rome at the highest echelon, but 
would also do so by sidestepping Constantinople entirely. For, although the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been 
reduced in modern times in both numbers and resources, it has nonetheless successfully retained its historic 
ascendance over the highly divided Orthodox world and does so in part by serving as its principal "broker" 
and interlocutor between its faithful and Christians of other confessions. 
In fact, Constantinople was not only among the first to champion Orthodox membership in the World 
and James Piscatori for the Committee on International Peace and Security of the Social Science Research 
Council (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 173-211; and in the author's still unpublished essay "The 
Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Movement - Considerations on Continuing Relations 
(Spring 1997)," (Spring 1997), Pp. 23. 
15 As broadcast by the BBC on the night of 22 June 1997 and reported by Reuters from. Vatican 
City and summarized in "Pope Appeals for Christians to Reconcile,'' The Moscow Times, 24 June 1997, 4. 
16 "Meeting ofPatriarch, Pope Canceled over Differences,'' The Moscow Times, 14 June 
1997, 3. 
17 For recent reiterations, see the dispatches from Moscow of 15 and 16 January 1998, 
respectively, an untitled Associated Press article and Reuters' "Russian Orthodoxy, Vatican Fail to 
Mend Fences,'' as re-transmitted by: news@holy-trinity.org 
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Council of Churches, now under broad attack by Orthodox conservatives, but in 1967 under the late Patriarch, 
His All Holiness, Athenagoras I, it also opened up a dialogue with the popes of Rome that has continued to 
this day. 
Until late, the papacy has always accorded a measure of preeminence to its relations with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. For that very reason, an exclusive meeting between John Paul II and Aleksiy II can probably be 
viewed as a nuanced shift in Rome's priorities and its tacit acknowledgment of Moscow's potentially greater 
role than Constantinople's in the now multi-polar world of religious dialogue that has emerged in the post -Cold 
War era. 
Incontrovertibly, Moscow's boast of60 million nominal Orthodox believers inside Russia and better than 
40 million more in neighboring Ukraine and Belarus alone makes it the single largest Orthodox Church in the 
world But outside Russia, that boast could be made empty. In those very same newly independent countries 
(once part of the former USSR), various nationalist forces, especially in Ukraine, openly deny - as did the 
Estonians - the Moscow Patriarchate's continuing claim of canonical authority over these distant Orthodox 
faithful now residing in nations of their own. 
The "Ukrainian Problem" 
Indeed, the "Ukrainian" problem (one so multi-faceted and complex that it requires patient explanation 
here) - and the chance to gain from Rome advantages for a Russian Orthodoxy that is now under ftre across 
Russia's very borders - was surely a second reason for the Heiligenkreuz meeting. 
What precisely might Moscow have hoped to gain? First of all, a more strenuous "taming" by Rome of 
the five million-strong Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). Established 400 years ago as a Byzantine 
rite in union with the See of Peter, it was "phoenix-like" reborn in the late eighties after having been legally 
"abolished" by Soviet authorities in 1946 and its properties and faithful "absorbed" by the Moscow 
Patriarchate. The post-Soviet era "battles" to repossess churches, monasteries and entire bodies of parishioners 
have still not been fully resolved. Indeed, both sides periodically claim that some of their respective 
communities still suffer from "oppression and persecution" -- perpetrated either by the faithful of the "other" 
confession or, as is not infrequently the case, powerful local political leaders partisan to one or another church 
(or their own re-election). 
In the mid-nineties, the UGCC - historically centered in Western Ukraine (and whose members Russian 
Orthodox pejoratively call "Uniates") - seems to have embarked on a "policy of 'national recognition,"' by 
situating new churches in the traditionally Orthodox Central and Eastern regions. (UGCC's critics condemn 
this course as an undeclared "policy of expansion;" whether it enjoys Rome's tacit approval also appears a 
matter of considerable dispute). 
Probably equally disconcerting to Moscow is the expressed intent of the UGCC to elevate its presiding 
Cardinal and Metropolitan in Lwiw to the rank of a Byzantine rite Patriarch (a rank historically never accorded 
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him) and then to move the would-be new see to Kyiw, Ukraine's capital and millennia! birthplace of ancient 
Rus's Slavic Orthodox Christianity. No less distressing has been the cordial relations Greek Catholics have 
maintained with the three nationalist Orthodox "currents" (that call themselves churches and as such are 
juridically fully incorporated in Ukraine). 
Not only do the latter dissent canonically- and patriotically, in their opinion- from the authority of the 
Moscow Patriarchate. But- in outright defiance of the Russian Orthodox Church of which they were once a 
part- two of these have also established their own "Patriarchate of Kiev and of all Rus-Ukraine." To add insult 
to injury, one of these self-proclaimed patriarchs, Filaret (Denisenko), was himself the former Metropolitan 
of Kiev of the Russian Orthodox Church, a member of its Holy Synod, and even a losing candidate in the 
patriarchal succession of 1990 (when the office was conferred upon Aleksiy m. Consequently, from the 
Moscow Patriarchate's perspective, Filaret's persistence in the "rump" office of "Patriarch of Kiev" amounted 
to condemnable perfidy and so justified not only the disciplinary actions meted out to him since 1994, but also 
in the face of his "disobedience" the order of excommunication decreed in February 1997 by the Russian 
Church's bienniel Bishops' Council.18 
Thus, whatever discomfort the Greek Catholics may cause, it is this troika of Ukrainian Orthodox 
Churches - numbering from a fifth to a third of the country's approximately 40 million nominal Orthodox (and 
whose histories and current politics cannot be broached here) - which is in the opinion of many observers the 
real threat to the Moscow Patriarchate's future.19 
How so? 
Suffice it to recall here that from the time of the Soviet army occupation of Western Ukraine in 1946 (then 
a part of Poland) until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Orthodox and Greek Catholics together (the 
latter then were "crypto-Greek Catholics"), hailing mostly from Western Ukraine and amounting to between 
a fifth and a third of the country's population, had together provided better than a third of all the seminarians 
18 With regard to the excommunication ofFilaret, see the "Russian Orthodox Church: Act on 
[sic] Excommunication of the monk Filaret [Mikhail Antonovich] Denisenko," dated 23 February 
1997 and available on line from the Moscow Patriarchate's website at: http.//www.russian-orthodox­
church.org.ru/sobor09e.htm# I 
19 The components of this "troika" are: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kievan Patriarchate; 
the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with its own Patriarch in Kiev; and a schismatic faction of 
the latter (these are discussed elsewhere in this footnote and in note 20 below). 
On Ukrainian Orthodox church rivalries and varying statistics, see the scholarship of Frank 
Sysyn, Serguei Plochiy, and Bohdan Bociurkiw varyingly published in the journal, Religion. State & 
Society: the newspaper .. The Ukrainian Weekly; and in Michael Bourdeaux, The Politics of Religion 
in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
For a recent account of current problems and interviews with Archbishop Mefodiy ofTemopolis 
and Podolsk of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (whose Patriarch is Dimitriy and against 
whom a new schism has erupted, thus creating a "second" Ukrainian Autocephalous Church), see the 
articles in NG-Religii, 5 (May 1997), the very informative monthly supplement on religion, begun in 
January 1997, of the Moscow daily newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 
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and clergy of the entire Russian Orthodox Church as well as a goodly portion - as much as a third - of its 
annual revenues. At the major theological academies of Zagorsk (outside Moscow and called today Sergey 
Posad) and St Petersburg, it was a standing joke that the "Ukrainians" had taken over the Russian Church.20 
Of course, today, it is not the privation per se of these human and material resources from Moscow that 
is critical (indeed, the Russian Church has made miraculous progress in the last five years in creating a 
substantial and independent economic base for itself). But, rather it is their commitment since independence 
by these now self·sufficient confessions to apply their own substantial resources to the cause of unifying all 
three of the anti-Moscow currents of Ukrainian Orthodoxy into a single new "Patriarchate ofKyiw and All 
Rus-Ukraine" -- one enjoying eventual autocephaly and thus no longer dependent on Moscow. 
Indeed, Moscow's fear of just such a direction led it late (in 1992), reluctantly, and as a largely tactical 
measure to grant a modicum of administrative "autonomy" to the current Russian Orthodox "Metropolitan of 
Kiev and all Ukraine" and his thirty-three prelates. Technically speaking, that step also holds out the promise 
of Kiev's one day gaining full autocephaly. But, because these churchmen still remain (by church law and 
choice) loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate - despite Ukraine's independence - and however much this position 
is canonically "correct,"21 many Ukrainians are not assuaged. Moreover, that the said Metropolitan continues 
to sit officially on the Holy Synod, the important interim governing body of the Russian Church, as do his 
prelates at its biennial Bishops' Councils, makes their claim for being a genuinely "autonomous" Ukrainian 
Church all the more implausible to Ukrainian nationalists. 
Three other factors seem to be working against Moscow's middle-run retention of influence over its 
Ukrainian Church. For one, popular support for the three Orthodox currents mentioned above and their 
20 The role of Ukraine within the Moscow Patriarchate just prior to the dissolution of the 
USSR (1989-1990) is sensitively described by the American Greek Orthodox Deacon, Anthony U golnik, 
"Burdened with History- Soviet Churches & The Search for Authenticity," Commonweal (21 December 
1990), 751-756. 
21 Canonically, a church may not declare itself either autonomous or autocephalous. Rather, 
it can appeal to its "mother church" for such independence and then -- wait. The Ecumenical Patriarchate 
may intervene to hasten and sanction the results of the process. 
In the case ofFilaret (Denisenko), the former Russian Orthodox Church's Metropolitan of 
Kiev, he had himself declared Patriarch of Kiev and all Rus-Ukraine -- after having lost out to Aleksiy II 
in the June 1990 election to fill the post of Patriarch of Moscow! 
For the Ukrainian Orthodox still loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and headed by Metropolitan 
Vladimir (Sabodan), Filaret is a fraud and usurper. Indeed, at the ROC's Bishops' Council convened in 
Moscow in February 1997 he was formally excommunicated for "anti-church activities," criminally 
ignoring an earlier church decree of banishment, performing "consecrations without possessing the holy 
priesthood," for daring "to call himself 'patriarch of Kiev and Rus-Ukraine', while the ancient throne of 
Kiev is lawfully occupied by a canonical representative of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the rank of 
metropolitan" who is in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate; see "Russian Orthodox Church: Act 
on [sic] Excommunication of the monk Filaret [Mikhail Antonovich] Denisenko," dated 23 February 
1997 and available on line from the Moscow Patriarchate's website at: http://www.russian-orthodox­
church.org.ru/sobor09e.htm# I 
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campaign for a fully independent Kievan-based Orthodoxy continues enthusiastic, even if the number of 
worshippers, parishes and dioceses appear to have remained stable over the last few years. 
For another, outside Russia and the former Soviet Union some other "autocephalous" (fully self­
governing) churches and prominent Orthodox clergy have expressed complete sympathy for Ukraine's cause 
and its �licit right to its own Patriarchate.22 In that context, Constantinople's ready defense of Estonia was 
widely construed as a step towards its eventual endorsement ofUkraine.23 (In that light, Moscow's temporary, 
but disproportionately aggressive break with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in early 1996 appears far more 
understandable). For still another, the prospect of a Kievan Patriarchate enjoys broad support from among 
Ukraine's politicians - across party lines and at every level of government. They have simply not yet reached 
a consensus on the tactics - either at home or in diplomatic circles - necessary to bring this about. 
Moscow on the World Stage? 
Of course, what specific action Moscow expects of Rome in regard to the Orthodox situation in Ukraine 
is hard to say. Surely, a major aim is to halt the further decline of Russian church influence there and in several 
bordering states (where in Soviet times it had enjoyed an effective monopoly).24 In the very least, a meeting 
of the Pope and Patriarch would fmally allow Moscow - on its own merits - to have Rome's ear just as 
Constantinople has long had. 
Moreover, such a meeting could bring a third and last boon to Moscow: the occasion to reveal itself on 
the world stage as a "major player" in the religious politics and strivings of our times. That stage has so far 
escaped it, while few of the world's personalities can command it with the same success as does Pope John 
22 A 1989 or 1990 article by the Rev. Basil Osborne, the Orthodox Auxiliary Bishop of Sourozh 
(Great Britai), published in the British Orthodox journal, Sourozh, argued early and strongly in favor of the 
Moscow Patriarchate's full endorsement of autocephaly for a Kievan Patriarchate; although I was informed 
of this article by a reliable source, I have not yet been able to verifY it. 
23 See the Rev. Kallistos Ware, "The Estonian Crisis: A Salutary Warning?," Sobornost (Oxford), 
18:2 (1996), 59-68. 
24 In public, the Moscow Patriarchate insists on an end to Catholic proselytism, to Rome's 
further extension of ecclesiastical structures inside Russia, and to its support of the Greek Catholics in 
Ukraine, demands that Rome could hardly meet. 
As to what Rome may have expected in exchange is also difficult to say. But few would 
dismiss the hope for a pastoral visit by the Holy Father to the Catholics of Russia, an undertaking that 
can hardly be expected to be easily agreed to at this juncture. Even were President Boris Yeltsin to 
extend such an invitation, Rome would unlikely accept were the Moscow Patriarchate to oppose it. 
Evidence of such a Vatican goal is only indirect: thus far, the Holy Father has put off several 
ecclesiastical requests for a papal visit to Ukraine, an option whose consequence would likely be to 
foreclose for a long time to come any papal visit to Russia. 
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Paul IP5 
The truth of the matter is that Orthodoxy in general and Russian Orthodoxy specifically have remained 
just "beyond the pale" of the global media.l6 As to Aleksiy II, none of his important trips abroad (neither to 
Germany nor the United States) has yet "put him on the map, " not even his strenuous June 1997 pilgrimage 
to the Holy Land. In fact, press reports of his support of the Palestinians sounded more reminiscent of the 
Soviet Union's one-time anti-Israeli policy than of one of the visit's intended goals "back home," viz., to help 
garner support from among Russia's twenty- two million nominal Moslems, who make up the country's second 
largest faith. 27 
Graz, or Vienna, or Heiligenkreuz - any one of them might just have been center stage. 
Why the CanceUation 
If so much was riding on the meeting, why did the Russians cancel it? Why did they do so literally after 
all the major joint pronouncements were said to have already been - in the opinion of observers close to the 
Vatican, but publicly denied by the Moscow Patriarchate - "signed, sealed and delivered?" And finally why 
did they do so on the night of the tenth of June- at a supposedly unscheduled meeting of the Holy Synod that 
had been organized on the spot only hours earlier during the reception celebrating the sixth anniversary of 
Aleksiy II's "enthronement" as Patriarch? 
The Patriarchate's official press release put the blame on the Vatican, contending that its representatives 
had "at the last minute ... removed passages from a planned joint declaration which were of crucial importance 
for the Russian Orthodox Church. "28 It then enumerated a litany of grievances which have been substantially 
25 Elsewhere, this Pope's relationship to media, media's decisive role in promoting religions' 
own objectives (despite the supposed bias against religious beliefs and the discourse of faith), and the 
supposedly "unlimited" world-wide power of media specifically rooted in the West to promote 
(inordinately, in the opinion of some) the historic faiths of the West have been widely discussed in 
several places. See, among others, Ralph Della Cava, "Vatican Policy, 1978-1991: An Updated 
Overview, " Social Research, 59: I (Spring 1992), pp. 169- 199. 
26 See "Orthodoxy Faces Media Bias in North America, US Expert Contends, " Orthodox 
Press Service, 1 :6 [New Series], 15 July 1997, an on-line news service, edited in Byalistok, Poland by 
the Orthodox Youth Movement and available via: syndesmos@telbank.pl 
27 Said Ghazali, "Alexy Asks Arafat to Aid Land Reform, " The Moscow Times, 18 June 
1997, 4. 
28 Andrei Zolotov,.�'Alexy.Blames Pope for Cancellation, " The Moscow Times, 17 June 1997, 
3. A fuller account can be found in the interview with the Moscow Patriarchate's Chancellor, Archbishop 
Sergiy of Solnechnogorsk, published as "Dialog Neobchodim, No V strecha Neymestna, " in the NG-Religii 
supplement No.6 (June 1997) of the weekly Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 June 1997, 3. In it, the Chancellor 
makes the Pope directly responsible for "overturning "a series of previous conditions agreed upon by both 
sides concerning the preparation of the meeting." He went on to say that "the major problem ... touched on 
the draft of the final document from which-- at the very last minute-- Vatican representatives excised 
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the same over the past couple of years and had certainly not altered in any significant way within the previous 
week or two after both sides had apparently finnly committed themselves to the meeting. 29 
What, then, really lies behind the cancellation? Answers other than official ones have simply been 
unavailable from either side. But one piece of speculatioq that made the rounds of Moscow diplomatic and 
church circles can be summed up in one word: Ukraine! 
But, not exactly for the reasons cited in the press conference. Rather, as the rumor had it, Ukraine's 
Orthodox ecclesiastics loyal to Moscow had actually lobbied hard against the meeting. In their minds, it would 
have only strengthened the hand of the "uniates" and their "friends" in the Orthodox "Kievan Patriarchate." 
Joining these Ukrainian "Moscovites" was probably the "anti-Polish," ultra-conservative faction of Russian 
prelates who have consistently labeled ecumenism a heresy and who played a key, but unsuccessful role at 
ROC's FebruBiy 1997 biennial Bishops' Council to end ties to non-Orthodox Christians. Moreover, these 
lobbyists had mounted their campaign just two weeks or so after the Georgian Orthodox Church ended its 
membership in the World Council of Churches and while anti-ecumenical forces in the Serbian Orthodox 
Church were gathering strength to do the same.30 
Those second-guessing this situation further speculated that neither Aleksiy II nor Kirill, the Metropolitan 
of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, a champion of ecumenism, since 1989 the experienced Director of the 
Patriarchate's Department of External Church Relations, and a key proponent of the meeting between Pope 
and Patriarch, had anticipated the ex1ent and depth of the internal opposition. Had they done so, the argument 
continues, they would never have led Rome on. When they perceived the danger - indeed, at the eleventh hour 
- they convened the impromptu session of the Holy Synod on whose shoulders, rather than on their own, the 
decision to cancel has since rested. As a result, the Patriarch was free to address a personal letter to the Pope 
immediately thereafter reiterating his wish "'that this meeting will be able to take place."' 
Perhaps Soon 
Indeed, no one speaks of losers. Nor does anyone dare suggest that the Russian church may simply be too 
mired in its own past and so still "unprepared," psychologically and theologically, to catch up with the sense 
such issues as the Uniates and their position in Western Ukraine and all questions connected with the 
condemnation of proselytism." I have been unable to confirm the accounts of either side. 
29 The two basic charges reported were: "Latin" Catholic proselytism in Russia; and, "uniate" 
(Greek Catholic) activities in Russia, Belarus and Western Ukraine; again, see the interview with the 
Moscow Patriarchate's Chancellor, Archbishop Sergiy of Solnechnogorsk, published as "Dialog 
Ncobchodim, No Vstrecha Neymestna," in the NG-Religii supplement No. 6 (June 1997), cited in 
note 28. 
30 See Andrei Zolotov, "Georgian Orthodox Church to leave WCC and CEC," Ecumenical 
News Service, 26 May 1997; and Fr. Sava [sic], "Possible Withdrawal of the Serbian [Orthodox] 
Church from WCC, 21 June 1997; both available on-line from: news@.holy-trinity.org 
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of ecumenism prevailing today in West Europe. At least, not publicly.31 
Rather, the statements from both sides, but especially from Catholic quarters, reinforce the Patriarch's 
hope "'that this meeting will be able to take place.'" Perhaps, the common vision of pope and patriarch putting 
an end to the "scandal" of Christianity's divisions and giving welcome to the Third Christian Millennium 
together in full solidarity may yet bring about the still unprecedented encounter. Nor can its historical 
significance be lost on both protagonists whose wills may yet win out over advancing age and failing health. 32 
Time is short, but in the end it never fails to reveal on whose side it was on. 
31 In private church circles, Orthodox and Catholic, both views have been heard expressed: 
for one, that the patriarchs of Rome, Moscow and Constantinople all "lost" a golden opportunity; for 
another, that a millennium of isolation and division is much harder for the Russian Orthodox Church 
to overcome because its great church reforms begun in 1917 -- long preceeding those of the Second 
Vatican Council ( 1962 to 1965) -- were aborted by the Bolshevik Revolution and its ensuing dvelopment. 
32 At 68, Patriarch Aleksiy II suffers from a heart condition which he has supposedly had 
monitored at American hospitals during his trips to the States; most recently, while in Austria, he 
collapsed during a three-hour religious service, according to "News in Brief," The Philadelphia Inguirer, 
"International Section," 23 June, 1997. 
Pope John Paul II's health contiDues to decline, although according to a recent visitor, "his 
mind remains as alert as ever." 
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